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Abstract  
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of board diversity on the extent to which 
firms invest in R&D. 
Design/methodology/approach – empirical analysis of 175 firm-year observations for Fortune 500 firms 
in high tech industries and the four different indications of diversity of their boards.  
Findings – Boards that can tap into a diversity of sources for information can be expected to make 
better decisions. Diversity in a team and a board can, however, also impede team performance. 
Measuring the diversity of boards in four different ways, two of which are person-related (age 
and gender) and two information-based (education and tenure), we analyze which kind of 
diversity ensures that the firm governed by a board will invest more R&D. We find, 
unexpectedly, that tenure diversity leads to firms being less innovative, while education diversity 
and gender diversity make firms more innovative. Gender diversity positively moderates 
education diversity as well, strengthening the effect found. We discuss the implications of our 
findings for management and society. 
Originality/value – This study conceptually differentiates between  2 information-based and 2 person-
related indications of board (team) diversity, theoretically elaborate on the effects they have, and 
provide empirical evidence for their effects. 
Keywords – board diversity, board decision making, R&D investment 
Paper type - Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Certain characteristics of teams, and especially the diversity of characteristics among members 
of a team, can contribute favorably to the team’s performance outcomes (van Knippenberg & 
Schippers 2007). This should hold, too, for boards of a firm, a firm’s management team. There 
have been studies indicating that board member characteristics such as age and experience 
enhance the financial performance of a firm (Carter et al. 2003; Chapple & Humphrey 2013; 
Ehrhardt et al. 2003), its social performance (Boulouta 2013) and its strategic change (Goodstein 
et al. 1994). Yet, boards of firms decide as a team, based on the information and insights brought 
to bear collectively. The focus should then be on the composition of a board (cf. Barker & 
Mueller 2012; Chen 2013). Some studies have focused on how firm boards collect relevant 
outside information (e.g., Li et al. 2013). How members of a board search for relevant 
information is determined in large part, the upper echelon literature suggests as well (e.g. 
Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996; Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004; Nielsen, 2009), by 
the characteristics of those who search. The cognitive frameworks that members of the board 
maintain determine search strategies they employ (Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; Reger, 1990; 
Reger and Palmer, 1996; Walton, 1986). If all members of a firm board have the same 
characteristics, they may end up making decisions quickly (Marcel et al. 2010), but they may 
draw on more limited information.  
Diversity in the board may give rise to disagreement and (task-oriented) conflict, among 
professionals which may prompt active information search and processing. When diversity 
relates to tasks, possible disagreement and even conflict gives rise to additional evidence 
gathering, and debate, as well as subsequent resolution and consensus building (Marcel et al. 
2010). Proper composition of the board of a firm, such that input and insights from all relevant 
sources are taken into account, may then reduce uncertainty, enhance information exchange 
between external organizations and the firm, increase access to resources, and aid in the 
formulation of firm strategy (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hillman & Dalziel 2003).   
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Board diversity enhances the alternatives available to, or considered by, the firm. 
Differences in the cognitive frameworks that executives possess have thus been linked to the 
effectiveness of strategic decision making (Marcel et al. 2010). Studies focusing on a limited 
number of indicators of diversity have indicated that board diversity may enhance performance 
outcomes (Hutschenreuther & Horstkotte 2013). Whether board diversity will ultimately affect 
firm commitment to innovation in terms of R&D investment we do not know, however (cf. van 
Knippenberg et al. 2011). Given that innovation is of great strategic importance, this paper 
addresses this important topic for research.  
 The added effect of board member characteristics such as gender, experience, 
education, age will only be noticed and contribute to firm performance, however, when they 
differ from the characteristics of others. Some believe, normatively, that having members on firm 
boards with certain characteristics, for instance gender is good per se (Carver 2002; Keasey et al. 
1997; Torchia et al. 2011). Studies of the composition of the firm board, including a number of 
different forms of diversity, are rare, however, as Hutschenreuter & Horstkotte (2013) indicate. 
Research so far has tended to single out one dimension of board diversity (cf. Hutschenreuter & 
Horstkotte 2013). When singling out one dimension along which to study diversity, effects that 
results in other dimensions of board diversity not being included in a study may unduly be 
ascribed to the single dimension of board diversity actually included (Hutzschenreuter & 
Horstkotte 2013). In addition, various dimensions of board diversity can interact to have effects 
on firm performance that differ markedly from their main effects. Intricate effects of diversity 
may be expected in particular when team decisions are made about issues that are shrouded in 
uncertainty and for which the consequences are visible only in the very long run. Studies on 
board composition have so far, perhaps surprisingly, shied away from studying innovation as the 
dependent variable.  
 This paper, analyzing a cross-section of firms in high-tech industries over a period of 
several years, contributes two important insights, bridging the literatures on corporate 
governance and that on innovation management. In contrast to studies that focus on a single 
industry or only consider a single year, the first insight we offer is that educational diversity in 
the board of a firm will lead to more R&D investment, but the same is not true for diversity in 
terms of experience (tenure). Secondly, gender diversity, itself having a positive effect, further 
enhances the positive effect of educational diversity inside firm boards.  
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 We progress along classical lines. We first discuss the relevant literature, developing 
two pointed hypotheses (Section 2). We elaborate on the data and method in Section 3. Results 
are presented in Section 4, after which a brief discussion and conclusion section  (Section 5) 
ensues.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
In team decision making research, it is well-established that diversity of input benefits the quality 
of the decision arrived at (Van Knippenberg & Schippers 2007). While some research (e.g., 
Barker III and Mueller 2002) has focused on the CEO in particular and the CEO can be very 
influential in a firm, he, typically, is not omnipotent. We focus on the management team or firm 
board. We follow, a.o., Bantel and Johnson (1989) who state that “in contrast to research that 
focuses on CEOs as solitary decision-makers, we focus on the top management team as the unit 
of analysis. We assume this dominant coalition acts as a decision-making unit for the 
organization.”  
 Diversity can be information- or task-based on the one hand, or it can be person-related 
on the other hand. Diversity of input for a team, including a firm board, can refer to the sources 
from which information is gathered (Marcel et al. 2010). If members of a team have a 
background in the relevant knowledge sourced themselves, they are better able to establish the 
value of a piece of knowledge themselves. That is why, contrary to Li et al. (2013), we focus on 
the diversity among team (board) members rather than on the sources from which members 
source their knowledge. Each member of this decision making unit responds to ambiguous and 
complex stimuli in a different way, attending to different cues and constructing different 
understandings, depending on their backgrounds. Given its position and prominence in a firm, 
the effect of board diversity may be particularly sizeable (Haynes & Hillman 2010; 
Hutschenreuter & Horstkotte 2013; Kor & Sundaramurthy 2009; Chen 2013). While 
information-based and person-related diversity are all argued to be related to attitudes, values 
and perspectives that people have (Bantel & Jackson 1989), information-based diversity in a 
team can be expected to enhance team performance, but person-related diversity in a team may 
hamper team performance (cf. Barker III & Mueller 2002). The former may in particular 
stimulate information gathering and processing, while the latter may particularly emphasize the 
conflicts and disagreements that diversity can induce. 
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 Information-based diversity inside a board, defined as diversity concerning 
characteristics believed to indicate people’s ability to select, collect and process relevant 
information, gives rise to enhanced exchange of more fundamental viewpoints between 
individuals. Tacit knowledge or knowledge that is taken for granted in one field or by many with 
long tenure inside the firm (organization) may not be equally taken for granted when someone 
has a different background (Cramton & Hinds, 2005). Information-based diversity in a firm 
board ensures that its members have a variety of sources of knowledge and related connections 
with other, outside experts to draw on (Woodman et al. 1993; Paulus 2000; Reagans and 
McEvily 2003). A judicial weighing of relevant information, at the team level, will then lead to 
better team decisions (Cramton & Hinds 2005; Williams & O’Reilly 1998). When shared within 
the team, the diversity of insights and knowledge at hand benefits the overall team’s knowledge 
base and enhances team performance (Allen 1977; Ancona and Caldwell 1992). Cognitive ability 
and judicial weighing relate to someone’s formal education (Bantel & Jackson 1989; Hülsheger 
et al. 2009; Wiersema en Bantel 1992). Individuals who have enjoyed a higher formal education 
may also more likely to take risks and be more favorably inclined to invest in R&D.  
 Knowledge about the firm’s resources and (technological) capabilities that increase 
with one’s tenure may also allow a board member to establish what the firm will be able to do 
and what knowledge or capabilities in a firm it can build on. On the other hand,  board members 
without long tenure in the firm can consider the firm as if they are an outsider and can perhaps 
better determine what the firm is supposed to do differently compared to its past (Cramton and 
Hinds 2005). Both what is required of the firm towards the future, as well what a firm is be able 
to do (in the short run) given its resources and capabilities may be considered in the board if the 
board is diverse in terms of tenure.   
 Especially when making decisions that will impact the firm in the longer term, in an 
area such as R&D investment that is, as Schumpeter insists, inherently about bringing together 
knowledge from different domains, information-based diversity should be expected to contribute 
positively (cf. Oldham & Cummings 1996). Hence we suggest the following hypothesis. 
 
 H1: Information-based board diversity (i.e. education [H1a], and tenure [H1b])  
 contributes positively to firm R&D investment. 
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Diversity in groups can also have deleterious effects on group level performance, however. The 
literatures from organizational psychology and social psychology discuss what is called 
faultlines as differences within groups separating one (or more) subgroups from another 
(Bezrukova et al. 2009). Specifically person-related differences are pointed to as differences that 
may pit one group against another. Gender, age and also ethnicity are mentioned as examples of 
person-related differences that can become a focal point for faultlines to emerge in a group. The 
extent to which non-alterable characteristics of individuals become the focus of negative 
meanings and associations in a group, establishing a faultline or faultlines, can differ by group. 
Especially age and gender can, however, be signified as faultlines creating (negatively afflicted) 
stereotypical 'us' and 'them'  (Lau & Muringhan 1998; Postuma & Campion 2009).   
 Stereotypes are activated in some contexts more quickly or more prominently than in 
others. Management teams, and particularly boards of large firms consist of professionals that 
are supported by a dedicated staff, however: person-related diversity may not distract from the 
task at hand directly (cf. Jehn 1995). Board members are also closely scrutinized by people in the 
firms, by share- and stakeholders, and by the press. When the decision concerns investing in 
R&D, the focus of the current study, board members are aware of the complexity of the situation 
and the long-term market and technological uncertainties involved. In such circumstances 
research shows that team members value information-based diversity since these will mean that 
the available information is considered from a number of different perspectives and angles (Jehn, 
Northcraft & Neale 1999). Contrary to what literature in organizational psychology suggests 
(Bezrukova et al. 2009),  in how boards decide, person-related differences are not as likely to 
have an immediate effect on the decisions taken.  
 Person-related differences, while not having a direct effect since that would decrease 
the potential diversity of knowledge introduced into the deliberations, may have a moderating 
effect on information processing, rather than a main effect. The decisions that members of the 
board make, based on the information they have and given their expertise, may, however, have 
an indirect effect on firm performance. Team members from across faultlines may bring different 
perspectives, considerations and to a degree ‘languages’ into meetings and exchange or 
interactions generally. How member of the board weigh the arguments or facts that another 
member of a board brings in may be different if the other member is from across a faultline (van 
Knippenberg & Schippers 2007). Levels of trust may be lower between individuals who 
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experience major person-related differences (Li & Hambrick 2005; Postuma & Campion 2009). 
Differences can prevent information from moving between team members, and cliques or 
coalitions can arise (Stevenson et al. 1985). Arguments and facts brought to bear may then be 
ignored or given less weight when they are introduced by someone at the same side of the 
faultline.  
 Fault lines may thus have a negative moderating effect on the decisions made that are 
otherwise determined by information-based diversity, as we suggest in hypothesis 2.   
 
 H2: Person-related board diversity (faultlines) (i.e. age [H2a], and gender [H2b]) will  
 negatively moderate a firm's enhanced R&D investment due to information-based  
 board diversity.     
 
Our analysis can be presented in the following conceptual framework (Figure 1). 
 
Figure1: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Data and Method 
For a period of 7 years, data for the 25 firms in the Fortune 500 that are in industries classified 
by the  OECD as high tech industries is collected. The industries involved are pharmaceutical, 
chemical, machinery and aerospace. Firms in these industries on average expend 4.5% of total 
sales into R&D (cf. Hatzichronoglou 1997) and are also likely to patent a large part of the 
knowledge that is developed: propensity to patent for these industries is at least 50% (Arundel & 
Kabla 1998). Firms were included in our study when they met the following criteria: a firm 1) 
Information-based 
Board Diversity 
(tenure, education) 
R&D Investment 
Person-related Board Diversity 
(age, gender) 
H1: + 
H2: -- 
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must be headquartered in the United States as the US has a one-tier board structure, ensuring 
that decisions are made by the board of directors only, 2) should be listed continuously in 
COMPUSTAT (merged and acquisitions are excluded from the sample), 3) must be publicly 
traded, and 4) listed in the Fortune 500 (explained below).  
 Our dependent variable is firm spending on R&D – firm boards can affect R&D 
investment, but have far less influence on the level of patenting, or on what new products are 
developed and introduced on the market. While many studies interested in research output use 
this measure, spending on R&D is not an ideal measure of research output (Dolfsma & van der 
Velde 2014; Kleinknecht et al. 2002). Our research is, however,  not primarily focused on 
research output, which is much less dependent on what  the board decides and much more on 
factors outside its own influence, but rather on a firm board's commitment and decision to invest 
in R&D. We believe that relying on published data about actual efforts by the firm to create and 
develop new knowledge and products, rather than survey data on board member self-reported 
assessment of firm innovativeness, as Torchia et al. (2011) do, is a robust measure of board 
decision making. R&D investment by firms is, moreover, a measure of firm innovativeness that 
is in line with the OECD’s Oslo manual (OECD 1992).  In addition to focusing on firms in high 
tech industries because of their similar patenting activities, we also focus on large firms only. 
The reason for this is that it is known that the extent to which firms are efficient at turning R&D 
investment into innovative output differs by firm size (Cohen 2010; Shefer & Frenkel 2005; Stock et 
al. 2002).  
 Our primary independent variables relate to diversity in firm boards. While most 
studies focus on a single dimension for board diversity, we include four dimensions. Two 
dimensions are information-based as they refer to the information required for a board member 
to do their job. One such measure for diversity is education, and the other is experience at the 
firm. Two other dimensions of diversity are person-related. We include gender and age. 
Obviously, a board member’s age and tenure at a firm are different things, as individuals can 
have a relatively long career, but their career can be at different firms or at a single one.  
 Diversity is measured using the Blau index - an index of dispersion of observations 
over a number of specified categories, represented by the following formula: 1-Σρi2. In this 
formula, i stands for the number of categories defined. Using the number (or percentage) of 
individuals in a board who have a particular characteristic, as Torchia et al. (2011) do, implicitly 
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assumes that including more individuals who have such a characteristics will have the expected 
effect on team performance. This assumption is not in line with the diversity argument pursued 
in this paper. 
 For gender the number of categories is two: female and male. For age we have 7 
categories of 5 years each, starting at 40 years of age. For tenure we have 5 categories (<2, 3-5, 
6-9, 10-14, >15). Different definitions of categories do not alter the results found.  Rather than 
looking at the kind of education followed, the level of education is included. Four levels are 
distinguished: bachelor, master, MBA, and PhD. Level of education indicates the extent to which 
an issue addressed by someone in a practical or rather more abstract manner. A number of 
scholars have found that this distinction is highly relevant for the current issue (e.g., Stevenson et 
al. 1985). 
 We include a number of control variables to be able to exclude  alternative 
explanations. Older and bigger firms are likely to be more aware of the importance of research. 
These firms might also be more aware of the efficiency of R&D investment turning input into 
research throughput (patents) or output (newly developed products). We thus include size (ln) 
and age of the firm. We also include a measure for the business cycle in the form of percentage 
change in GDP compared with last year, since less may be invested in R&D when the economy 
is depressed. Given the nature of the data we have, we opt for straightforward OLS regressions – 
these offer the most readily interpretable findings. 
  
4. Results 
Table A1, in the appendix, presents descriptive statistics. Our main findings are presented in 
Table 1 below. These findings are remarkable in several respects. Educational diversity is 
positively related to innovativeness by the firm, while diversity in Tenure is negatively related 
with innovativeness, and both consistently so. These findings are in partial support of hypotheses 
1. We find support for H1a related to educational diversity (H1a), but not for our Tenure 
diversity hypothesis (H1b).  
 The situation with regard to hypotheses 2a and 2B is more mixed. The main effect of 
Age on innovativeness is statistically negligible, while the main effect of Gender is positive, in 
the latter case also after interaction terms are introduced. Age diversity, indeed, as we predict in 
hypothesis 2A, negatively moderates the main (positive) effect of Education diversity. The same 
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is not true for Tenure diversity: Age diversity does not negatively moderate the effect of Tenure 
diversity. In addition, the effect of Gender diversity as a faultline actually positively moderates 
the main (positive) effect of Educational diversity. This finding is in direct contrast with what we 
predict in hypothesis 2b. Gender diversity plays no moderating role with respect to Tenure that is 
statistically traceable. The negative effect of Tenure is not attenuated when one considers 
interactions with Age or Gender diversity.  
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Table 1: Effects of Board Diversity on Firm R&D investment 
 Base Models  
(I)      (II) 
Moderation:  Age 
(II)          (IV) 
Moderation: Gender 
(V)                    (VI) 
Controls:       
Firm size 1.025***  
(1.280) 
0.865*** 
(6.967) 
0.866*** 
(6.947) 
0.853*** 
(7.068) 
 
0.823*** 
(6.789) 
0.747*** 
(6.081) 
 
Firm age 0.002 
(0.979) 
-0.001  
(-0.338) 
-0.001 
(-0.343) 
0.000 
(-0.202) 
 
-0.003 
(-1.418) 
-0.006** 
(-2.302) 
 
GDP (% change) -0.012  
(-0250) 
-0.016  
(-0377) 
-0.016 
(-0.378) 
-0.008 
(-0.180) 
 
0.003 
(0.074) 
0.004 
(0.095) 
 
Board Diversity:       
Education - 6.889*** 
(6.334) 
6.908*** 
(6.167) 
7.407*** 
(6.804) 
 
5.865*** 
(5.358) 
7.371*** 
(6.083) 
Tenure - -3.843*** 
(-2.830) 
-3.860*** 
(-2.789) 
-3.441*** 
(-2.579) 
-3.915*** 
(-2.975) 
-4.064*** 
(-3.114) 
Age - - 0. 122 
(0.071) 
0.585 
(0.355) 
- - 
Gender - - - - 4.098*** 
(3.460) 
3.735*** 
(3.178) 
Moderations:       
Education * Age - - - -0.384*** 
(-3.969) 
 
- - 
Tenure * Age - - - -0.023 
(-0.240) 
- - 
Education * 
Gender 
- - - - - 0.240** 
 (2.526) 
 
Tenure * Gender - - - - - 0.135 
(1.326) 
R2 0.250 0.416 0.416 0.467 0.455 0.480 
Adj. R2 0.237 0.398 0.395 0.441 0.435 0.455 
F-test 18.983 23.974 15.890 8.002 21.012 4.106 
Notes: N=175 firm-year observations; un-standardized coefficients; t-values in parentheses; 
*/**/*** Significant at 10/5/1 percent levels. 
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5. Conclusion and Implications 
In analyzing how the composition of a firm’s board affects firm innovativeness (R&D 
investment), this study includes, uniquely, four different kinds of diversity. Building on diversity 
and upper echelon literatures, we conceptualize two as information-based types of diversity 
(education and tenure) and two as person-related types of diversity (gender and age). We argue 
theoretically, and show empirically, that how a firm's board is composed makes a difference in 
terms of investment in R&D. We find that the effect of diversity in firm boards, contrary to what 
some suggest (see van Knippenberg et al. 2011), is not uni-directional.   
 Conceptually distinguishing and empirically analyzing differences  for the categories of 
information-based and person-related board diversity, we present unexpected results. Sometimes 
differences are beneficial, and sometimes they are detrimental. Diversity in Gender and 
Education contribute to a firm’s increased tendency to invest in R&D. What is more, diversity in 
Gender further enhances, or positively moderates, the positive effect of Education diversity. 
Diversity inside a firm board in terms of Tenure makes it less likely to invest in R&D. 
Considerations of legacy and the awareness of path dependency in production, markets catered to 
and supply chains dependent on might lead to a reduced tendency to innovate and invest in R&D 
for board members with higher tenure, as these might upset the status quo,. The firm-specific 
experience Tenure provides seems to drive this effect as Age diversity does not have the  effect 
of reducing R&D investment. The negative direct effect of Tenure diversity is not attenuated by 
an interaction with Age or Gender diversity.  
 
From a managerial point of view, knowing what types of diversity will impact likely outcomes 
of decision processes in top management teams is an important insight. Information-based 
diversity and person-related diversity have impacts that run counter to what the literature and 
what common sense would expect. The composition of management teams can now be 
considered with more confidence. Whom to include in a firm's board will thus significantly 
affect firm performance, and boards and shareholders should definitely take the composition of 
the firm board as a whole, and not just the characteristics of single board members, into account. 
In managing the composition of a firm’s board, an organization may need to find a balance 
between involving the right kind of diversity for firm performance to be enhanced on the one 
hand, and representing diverse stakeholder interests on the other hand.  
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 The findings in this paper also indicate that properly organizing for firm innovativeness 
is not limited to an R&D department (cf. Aalbers & Dolfsma 2015). Sustained firm innovation, 
made possible by R&D investment, depends on elements organizationally removed from an 
R&D department: diversity in the top management team drives firm innovativeness in its own 
right (cf. Metz et al. 2015). 
 
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest policy makers might want to stimulate the right 
kind of diversity at board level to enhance firms’  innovative outcome. Innovation policy might 
need to be focused on “soft” issues such as board composition, rather than merely “hard” issues 
such as patenting, R&D investment.  
  
One would have to carefully consider which diversity to stimulate, keeping in mind what the 
relevant outcome variable is. Our findings are limited to the outcome variable chosen (R&D 
investment). Effects of the information-based (education and tenure) and person-related (gender 
and age) diversity can also change over time. Additional indicators of group diversity may need 
to be taken into account. There might be interaction effects not yet considered to surface. Also, 
non-linear effects can at some stage emerge. Future studies could take these possibilities into 
account when extending our conceptual framework for the effects of information-based and 
person-related diversity in team composition on performance outcomes.  Given how some 
findings are unexpected from the perspective of existing literature, more insights are required as 
to why the main and interaction effects we found actually exist.  
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics   
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 R&D  13.2042   1.50276   
 
       
2 GDP  1.2000   2.04827   -0.19  
 
      
3 Size firm 10.7785   0.74227   0.495**   -0.002  
 
     
4 Firm age 89.52   40.653   -0.19   -0.16   -0.169*    
 
    
5 Education  
(diversity)  
0.620593 0.0850223 0.462**   0.041   0.189*   0.187*  
 
   
6 Tenure   
(diversity) 
0.711853 0.0653503 -0.137   0.070   0.055   -0.002   0.020  
 
  
7 Gender  
(diversity)   
0.255678 0.0815016 0.337**   -0.113   0.094   0.340**   0.331**   0.016  
 
 
8 Age    
(diversity) 
0.722402 0.0544446 -0.137   0.030   -0.067   0.078   -0.208** 0.170*           0.128  
 
n= 175; *p < 0.05; **p <0.01. 
